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Abstract
National Action Plans (NAPs) on business and human rights are a growing phenom-
enon. Since 2011, 42 such plans have been adopted or are in-development world-
wide. By comparison, only 39 general human rights action plans were published 
between 1993 and 2021. In parallel, NAPs have attracted growing scholarly interest. 
While some studies highlight their potential to advance national compliance with 
international norms, others criticise NAPs as cosmetic devices that states use to 
deflect attention from persisting abuses and needed regulation. In response to wider 
critiques of international human rights norms, and their failure to exact universal 
state compliance, experimentalist governance theory highlights the dynamic, dia-
logic and iterative character of human rights implementation as well as the role of 
stakeholders. In this article, we apply experimentalist governance theory to evaluate 
the role and character of business and human rights NAPs. Rather than attempting to 
evaluate NAPs’ ultimate consequences for rights-holders, which appears premature, 
we focus on NAPs processes. Specifically, we analyse NAPs processes in twenty-five 
states against five experimentalist governance criteria relating to (i) stakeholder par-
ticipation; (ii) agreement on a broad problem definition; (iii) local contextualisation; 
(iv) monitoring and peer review and (v) periodic revision and learning. According to 
our findings, NAPs on business and human rights in most states demonstrate resem-
blance to the traits of experimentalist governance. In particular, our analysis points 
to the emergence of relatively sophisticated and demanding institutional governance 
mechanisms within NAPs — including the institutionalisation of complex delibera-
tive processes. Nevertheless, our paper also identifies some significant shortcom-
ings in NAPs, related to the lack of inclusion of vulnerable groups and the lack of 
explicit indicators and targets.
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Introduction
National Action Plans (NAPs) on business and human rights are a growing phe-
nomenon.1 Over the last ten years, 42 business and human rights NAPs have been 
published or are in-development worldwide. Fewer general human rights NAPs (39) 
were published over the forty-year period between 1993 and 2021. In parallel, NAPs 
have attracted growing scholarly interest (see, for example, De Felice and Graf, 
2015; Methven O’Brien et  al. 2016; Soh and Nam, 2018; Augenstein et  al. 2018; 
Cantu Rivera, 2019; Hampton, 2019). While some studies highlight their potential 
to advance national compliance with international norms, others criticise NAPs 
as cosmetic devices that states use to deflect attention from persisting abuses and 
needed regulation.
Pronouncing on the consequences of business and human rights NAPs for rights-
holders or their ultimate effectiveness as drivers of regulatory change seems prema-
ture. On the other hand, the character of NAPs processes can still be meaningfully 
assessed. Building on earlier work (Ferguson et  al. 2018; Methven O’Brien et  al. 
2016), as well as insights from practice,2 this article makes a novel contribution to 
scholarly discussion of business and human rights NAPs by evaluating NAPs pro-
cesses from the perspective of experimentalist human rights governance (de Búrca 
et al., 2014; de Búrca 2017).
Twentieth century critics of international human rights norms have questioned 
their effectiveness and legitimacy (Hathaway 2002, Neumayer 2005, Goldsmith and 
Posner 2005, Hathaway 2007, Moyn 2012, Posner 2014). Experimentalist human 
rights governance theory embodies one response to such critiques. This suggests 
a revised understanding of the mechanisms by which international human rights 
norms take effect within and beyond states. According to experimentalist tenets, 
implementation of international human rights norms is not a top-down, linear pro-
cess of transposing specific rules to national contexts on a one-off basis. Rather, like 
certain other efforts to address complex transnational collective problems, human 
rights implementation is a dynamic, iterative and an “institutionalised process of 
participatory and multi-level collective problem-solving” (de Búrca et  al., 2014, 
p.477) which relies essentially on “cooperation between different actors and learn-
ing as a way to support accountability and transparency” (Armeni 2015, p.882; see 
also de Búrca 2010; de Búrca et al. 2013; Goldstein and Ansell 2018). Another key 
feature of experimentalist governance is subordinate processes which apply discre-
tion, informed by deliberation and local data, to devise programmes aligned with the 
goals of the international norms in question.
Besides being a sub-field of human rights, the experimentalist lens appears 
appropriate to business and human rights for other reasons. As argued elsewhere 
(Methven O’Brien and Ford 2019), business and human rights problems, in terms 
of abuses and implementation gaps, are endemic across economies; root causes are 
1 A business and human rights NAP is an “evolving policy strategy developed by a State to protect 
against adverse human rights impacts by business enterprises in conformity with the [United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Busines and Human Rights]” (UNWG 2012).
2 Footnote removed to preserve anonymity.
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multiple and hard to diagnose; value conflicts are pervasive; and solutions, if they 
are to be had, imply the pooling of knowledge, resources and sustained multi-actor 
cooperation (Methven O’Brien 2019; see also Kenner and Peake 2017). Accord-
ingly, business and human rights carries a likelihood of value conflicts across states, 
local policy variation and a need to evaluate effectiveness over time, rather than 
against a prior universal template.
On this basis, and advancing a line of inquiry embarked on by scholars in other 
policy fields (e.g. Goldstein and Ansell; Kenner and Peake, DeBurca), we consider it 
relevant to investigate whether business and human rights NAPs processes function 
in line with experimentalist governance theory. If such NAPs do already, or demon-
strate potential in the future, to function as elements of an experimentalist business 
and human rights governance architecture, this might lend further weight to experi-
mentalist and specifically experimentalist human rights governance theory. In addi-
tion, it might add strength to arguments favouring a framework convention approach 
to an international business and human rights treaty (Methven O’Brien 2019). On 
the other hand, if business and human rights NAPs lack the role or qualities required 
by experimentalist governance theory, it may be asked, whether they could do so, 
and if so, under what conditions. Alternatively, it might follow that other approaches 
to international standard-setting and national implementation of international busi-
ness and human rights norms should be pursued instead.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces experimentalist govern-
ance theory and experimentalist human rights theory. Section 3 describes the ante-
cedents to business and human rights NAPs, as well as the range of policies and 
measures that have, since 2011, been adopted to promote them. Section 4 considers 
guidance from human rights bodies on how business and human rights NAPs should 
be developed and what they should contain. This section further shows how the 
main recommendations contained in NAPs guidance map to the main characteristics 
of experimentalist governance outlined by its proponents. In Sect.  5, we evaluate 
existing business and human rights NAPs against these criteria. Section 6 discusses 
the significance of our findings and Sect.  7 concludes, highlighting questions for 
future research.
Experimentalist Governance: Context and Concept
Scholarship in political science, international relations, sociology and law upholds a 
difference between “government” and “governance”, as two paradigms of regulation 
and public administration.3 Government, in this sense, connotes efforts by the state 
to achieve its aims through hierarchy, the exercise of formal authority, and “com-
mand and control”, for instance, via detailed legislative schemes backed by statutory 
enforcement agencies and powers (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Guy Peters 2011). 
3 By regulation we refer, with Black (2008, p.139), to “sustained and focused attempts to change the 
behaviour of others in order to address a collective problem or attain an identified end or ends, usually 
through a combination of rules or norms and some means for their implementation and enforcement, 
which can be legal or non-legal.”.
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Preconditions of the effectiveness of “government” on this account include a single 
legislative centre and unitary bureaucracy enjoying accurate knowledge of societal 
conditions; social uniformity; a high level of social (and market) compliance with 
enacted rules; and adequate resources to support centralised oversight and enforce-
ment mechanisms.
During the era of the modern state, this concept of “government” was historically 
prevalent. In the later twentieth century, however, some of its prerequisites appeared 
to weaken.Sociologists and socio-legal scholars highlighted the relative autonomy 
of society from direct government intervention (see, for example, Teubner, 1983; 
1997). Besides, during the 1970s and 1980s, market mechanisms found political 
favour while national and international actors attributed economic problems to over-
reliance on, or intrinsic failures of, centralised government planning (Chimhowu 
et al. 2019, p.79; World Bank 1983). At the same time, new transnational environ-
mental, security and technological challenges triggered the rise of supranational 
institutions. Authority was observed to have dispersed “upwards to the supranational 
level, downwards to subnational jurisdictions, and sideways to public/private net-
works” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, p.4). Given the limited mandates and resources of 
international institutions, this encouraged, amongst others, the growth of public–pri-
vate partnerships, while international organisations “increasingly orchestrated new 
forms of authority involving non-state actors” (de Búrca et al. 2013, p.734–735), for 
instance, via policy networks.4
In this context, governance emerged as a “research agenda on order and disorder, 
efficiency and legitimacy all in the context of the hybridization of modes of con-
trol that allow the production of fragmented and multi-dimensional order within the 
state, by the state, without the state, and beyond the state” (Levi-Faur, 2012). Often 
found in domains governed by soft law, governance was observed to involve “actors 
other than classically governmental actors, or indeed the absence of any traditional 
framework of government” and “approaches which are less rigid, less prescriptive, 
less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature” than conven-
tional regulation (de Búrca and Scott 2006, p.2).
“New governance” was coined as an umbrella term denoting “a range of pro-
cesses and practices” identified by researchers “that have a normative dimension but 
do not operate primarily or at all through the formal mechanism of traditional com-
mand and control type legal institutions” (de Búrca and Scott 2006, p.2). Across 
policy domains, new governance regimes were found to emphasise the “accom-
modation and promotion of diversity… the importance of provisionality and revis-
ability – in terms of both problem definition and anticipated solutions—and… the 
goal of policy learning” (de Búrca and Scott 2006, p.3). New governance arrange-
ments incorporated “states, sub-state units, international organizations, civil society 
organizations, private actors, and others” in arrangements lacking formal hierarchy 
4 As Slaughter observed in 1997: “The state…is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct 
parts. These parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures are networking with 
their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental 
order” (1997, p.184).
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(de Búrca et al. 2013, p.726, see also, Keohane and Victor 2011; Ruggie 2002). In 
the specific setting of the European Union, the “Open Method of Coordination” 
(OMC) sought to drive coordination and convergence across the EU’s member 
states towards commonly agreed goals, in areas where binding laws were lacking, 
via peer exchange, dialogue and review, reporting against standardised metrics as 
a basis of benchmarking to promote their achievement, and National Action Plans 
(NAPs) (Panke and Haubrich-Seco 2016).
These developments triggered reflection on the legitimacy of such mechanisms 
for achieving public goals or implementation of legal norms, given that they could 
not lay claim to be representative or enjoy delegated authority in conventional terms. 
Ideals of deliberative rationality here entered into play (Fung and Wright 2003, 
p.4).5 Likewise, new governance entailed accountability challenges (Black 2002; 
Bovens 2006; Sabel and Simon 2006; Black 2008) and a need to reflect on the con-
cept of law itself, stimulating interest in legal pluralism (De Sousa Santos 1995; 
Teubner 1997; see generally Berman 2020).
Experimentalist governance theory took shape against this background (de Búrca 
and Scott 2006). Experimentalist governance, scholars suggested, could be identified 
in policy areas characterised by persistent uncertainty or value conflicts, where gov-
ernments or other parties could agree on a broad problem definition but lacked the 
know-how or agreement necessary to isolate specific solutions (Búrca et al. 2013, 
p.740).6 Experimentalist governance regimes “set provisional goals” rather than 
fixed rules. In response to social complexity (Nance and Cottrell, 2014) or where 
the issue at hand is characterised by “insufficient information and uncertainty” (Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2016, p.193; see also, Sabel and Zeitlin 2012), experimentalist regimes 
institutionalise stakeholder participation and processes for revision.7 This approach 
according to scholars produces greater learning, adaptation and reliability over time 
(Sabel and Simon 2011, p.55).
Experimentalist human rights governance was advanced in response to recent cri-
tiques of international human rights norms that questioned their effectiveness and 
legitimacy (Hathaway 2002, Neumayer 2005, Goldsmith and Posner 2005, Hatha-
way 2007, Moyn 2012, Posner 2014). For example, in her analysis of the human 
rights treaty system, de Búrca (2017, p.279)8 argues that the “iterative interaction 
between civil society actors, UN treaty bodies, and governmental actors”, transforms 
5 Amongst US-based scholars, many accounts referred back to pragmatism and Dewey’s “democratic 
experimentalism” (Dewey 1927; Dorf and Sabel 1998) while in Europe, connections were explored to 
the work of Habermas and Luhmann, amongst others (e.g. Teubner 1983; Joerges and Neyer 2006).
6 For example, the EU and the Open Method of Coordination (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Zeitlin 2011); 
HIV/AIDS (Goldstein and Ansell 2018); Bangladesh Sustainability Compact (Kenner and Peake 2017); 
climate change technologies (Armeni 2015). Sabel and Simon (2011) focus on exepimentalism in “man-
agement-based regulation” schemes in the areas of environmental, health, mining and nuclear and safety 
(p.83) and social welfare (pp.89–93).
7 This distinguishes experimentalist governance from regime complexes and distributed networks which 
still tend to “fix precise, binding, and definitive rules to give effect to their policy preferences”: de Búrca 
et al., 2013p.743.
8 de Búrca (2017) examines three of the UN human rights treaty systems—the CEDAW, CRC, and 
CRPD.
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the human rights treaty process “into [a] more participatory and accountable exper-
imentalist governance system[]” (p.310). According to de Búrca (2017, 279), not 
only does an experimentalist governance account better reflect the actual operation 
of the treaty regime, the interaction between key actors, especially when associated 
with an “ active domestic civil society”, tends to be associated with positive domes-
tic human rights outcomes.
In their 2013 account, de Búrca et al (2013, p.723) identify five key features of 
experimentalist governance9:
1.Openness to participation of ‘stakeholders’ who must share at least a broad 
perception of a common problem in a non-hierarchical process10;
2.Articulation of a framework definition of a problem or goals which identifies 
open-ended objectives to be pursued;
3.Implementation is “left to ‘lower-level’ actors with knowledge of local condi-
tions and considerable discretion to adapt the framework norms to these different 
contexts” (de Búrca et  al. 2014, p.478; de Búrca et  al. 2013, p.739; Sabel and 
Simon 2011, p.55);
4.Continuous feedback from local actors incorporating “mutual monitoring and 
peer review, involving elaborate processes of consultation that are horizontal 
rather than vertical in structure”, serving an accountability function (de Búrca 
et al. 2013, p.742);
5.Revision and re-evaluation: goals and practices are “periodically and routinely 
re-evaluated and, where appropriate, revised in light of the results of the peer 
review and the shared purposes” (de Búrca et al. 2014, p.478).
Experimentalist governance, then, is a theory derived from institutional observa-
tion by social scientists. Yet, it is also viewed by its socio-legal scholar exponents as 
“normatively attractive” (de Búrca 2017, p.281) insofar as it is claimed to encour-
age “participatory, deliberative, locally-informed, and adaptive problem solving” (de 
Búrca et al. 2014, p.480; see also Armeni 2015, p.876) while being able to address 
contemporary transnational challenges in ways that state-based actors and “tradi-
tional” governmental processes, for a variety of reasons as alluded to above, cannot 
(de Búrca et al. 2014; de Búrca et al. 2013, p.727; Methven O’Brien 2019, p.204).
On the above basis, we suggest, an experimentalist governance analysis of busi-
ness and human rights NAPs is relevant while also making a novel scholarly con-
tribution. First, the implementation via NAPs of international soft law standards 
on business and human rights, namely the UNGPs, represents a further empirical 
9 Although all five of these features must be present in order for a governance system to be considered 
experimentalist, de Búrca (2010, p.235) notes:“[T]he two most crucial features of an experimentalist-
governance system, and those without which the system will fail in addressing the problem, are (1) the 
broadest possible degree of stakeholder participation compatible with effective decision-making, and (2) 
effective and informed monitoring”; see also de Búrca et al. 2013, p.726, 2014).
10 The absence of hierarchy is defined here in a notably modest way: according to Goldstein and Ansell 
(p.230–231), “While the [experimentalist] model envisions a central unit, this unit is not a hegemon 
imposing its will.”.
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setting for testing experimentalist governance theory and experimentalist human 
rights theory specifically, advancing a line of inquiry embarked on by others (cf. 
Nance and Cottrell, 2014, p.284; Kenner and Peake, 2017; Goldstein and Ansell, 
2018; de Burca, 2017). Second, it may illuminate whether the national implemen-
tation of business and human rights norms mirrors or diverges from that of other 
human rights standards. Third, it may shed light on the ongoing debate over how an 
international business and human treaty should be designed, in terms of substantive 
content, institutionalisation, oversight and accountability mechanisms. Last but not 
least, though it is not yet timely to draw final conclusions on the efficacy of NAPs as 
drivers for regulatory change, business behaviour, or the effectiveness of enjoyment 
of human rights for individuals and groups in the market sphere, evaluating NAPs 
processes in terms of experimentalist governance may yield tentative indications of 
what to expect in these areas in future.  It may also help to better qualify understand-
ing of the reasons for ready pursuit of business and human rights NAPs by states 
and others, while also guiding reflection about what may be expected to result from 
this trend in the years ahead.
Business and Human Rights NAPs: Antecedents and Current Practice
In this section, we provide an outline of the emergence of NAPs in the area of 
human rights before providing an overview of the current state of play with regard 
to business and human rights NAPs. In Sect. 4, we then consider the extant guidance 
on the development of business and human rights NAPs in order to more explicitly 
consider how such guidance tracks against the experimentalist governance criteria 
outlined above.
National Action Plans on Human Rights
Since the 1980s, intergovernmental bodies have encouraged the adoption of NAPs 
as a device to advance states’ fulfilment of international obligations and policy 
commitments. This approach has been applied across domains including “greening 
public procurement” (European Commission 2020), public health (Tuangratananon 
et al. 2019), tobacco control, gender equality (PeaceWomen 2020), anti-corruption 
and human trafficking (ICMPD 2006), climate change, biodiversity, corporate social 
responsibility as well as human rights.
Regarding the latter, the first textual reference to the adoption of national action 
plans can be traced to provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Chalabi 2014, p.391; see also Chalabi 2018a; 
2018b). Later, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action urged states to 
“consider…drawing up a national action plan identifying steps whereby that State 
would improve the promotion and protection of human rights” (UN OHCHR 
1993, p.17; Chalabi 2014). To date, 39 countries have developed such plans, 
often with support from international agencies, such as the UN Office of the High 
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Commissioner of Human Rights or UN Development Programme, and linked to 
post-conflict or democratic transition.11
Subsequently, the use of NAPs to advance implementation of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014) 
and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Lorion, 2019) has 
been advocated. States have regularly been recommended to develop NAPs by UN 
treaty monitoring bodies, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (Chalabi 2014).
Neither the UN Human Rights Council 2008 Framework, UNGPs  UN Human 
Rights Council 2011 on business and human rights nor associated UN Human 
Rights Council resolutions identify specific mechanisms for national implementa-
tion, whether NAPs or alternatives such as focal points or government coordination 
mechanisms.12 The mandate of the UN Working Group on Business and Human 
Rights established by UN HRC Res 17/4 embraces the promotion of the UNGPs at 
national level but does not advert to any national processes or structures in particular 
(UN HRC 2011).
Nonetheless, the idea of business and human rights-specific NAPs quickly grew 
in prominence. Their first mention in a formal policy appeared in the European Com-
mission’s 2011 White Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility. This invited Mem-
ber States “to develop … national plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding 
Principles” (European Commission 2011, p.13–14), reflecting the EU’s reliance on 
NAPs in other policy areas as a mechanism to promote convergence across member 
states where legal obligations were lacking, as mentioned above.
The European Council’s ‘Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democ-
racy’ (Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2015) 
reiterated a call to states to develop business and human rights NAPs, as did later 
Council-focused recommendations (e.g. Dutch Government 2016; Finnish Gov-
ernment 2019; German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2020); and Conclu-
sions on Human Rights and Decent Work in Global Supply Chains (Council of the 
European Union 2020). Beyond the EU, NAPs have been recommended by the UN 
Human Rights Council (UN Human Rights Council 2014), Council of Europe (COE 
2014) and Organization of American States (2014, 2016), while the OECD rec-
ommended its NAPs as a tool to advance “responsible business conduct” (OECD 
2017).
Human rights actors also engaged in advocacy and the production of guidance on 
business and human rights NAPs. Recommendations by the European Network of 
National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) urged the need for a “human rights-
based approach” (UN 2003) encompassing inclusion, transparency, participation and 
accountability in NAPs processes (ENNHRI 2012, 2020). A UN special mandate, 
the Working Group on Business and Human Rights, issued NAP guidance along 
similar lines (UN Working Group 2012). Following wide-ranging consultations, the 
11 See e.g. https:// www. ohchr. org/ en/ issues/ plans actio ns/ pages/ plans ofact ionin dex. aspx and OHCHR, 
Handbook on National Human Rights Plans of Action (2002), available at: https:// www. ohchr. org/ 
Docum ents/ Publi catio ns/ train ing10 en. pdf
12 Such elements are referred to under UNCPRD Article 33, for example.
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Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and International Corporate Accounta-
bility Roundtable (ICAR) published a ‘Toolkit’ on business and human rights NAPs 
(DIHR/ICAR 2014; 2017). DIHR and ICAR then collaborated with other organisa-
tions to produce NAPs guidance addressing specific sectors, themes or categories 
of rights-holders, such as children’s rights (DIHR, ICAR and UNICEF 2016); the 
extractive sector (Due Process of Law Foundation and ICAR 2017); the tech sector 
(DIHR and Global Partners Digital 2020) and private security (DCAF and DIHR 
2020a, b).
Business and Human Rights NAPs: Current Practice
By the end of 2020, twenty-five states had published business and human rights NAPs 
(DIHR 2020a, b). Nineteen of these came from Council of Europe states and fifteen 
from EU member states. Asian states account for three; Latin America for two; and 
the USA the last (Table 1). While adoption of NAPs across world regions is hence 
uneven, regional differences could diminish in future: of seventeen states developing 
business and human rights NAPs the Americas and Asia each account for five, Africa 
for four and Europe three (Table 2). Also at end 2021, four states were producing 
revised, updated or second business and human rights NAPs (DIHR 2020a, b). A few 
states have been prompted to develop NAPs by recommendations received through 
the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process (ibid.).13 An overall total of forty-
two published and in-development business and human rights NAPs compares with 
thirty-nine general human rights NAPs produced since1993 (OHCHR 2020).
*Business and human rights chapter within broader human rights NAP.
Guidance on Business and Human Rights NAPs
Two guidance documents on business and human rights NAPs have been widely 
relied on by government and other actors in the NAPs processes just enumer-
ated. These are the DIHR-ICAR Toolkit (2017, 2011) and UNWG NAPs guidance 
(UNWG 2014, 2016). This section considers how far these documents’ recom-
mendations map to the character and role of local implementation hypothesised by 
experimentalist governance theory; in doing so, this section highlights the consider-
able degree of overlap between NAP guidance the experimentalist governance crite-
ria outlined above.
Both the DIHR-ICAR Toolkit and UNWG NAPs guidance envisage an iterative 
cycle: the five steps in the diagram extracted from the Toolkit (DIHR/ICAR 2017) 
also constitute the “essential” phases flagged by the UNWG NAPs guidance (2014, 
2016, p.ii) (Fig. 1).
Both guides first emphasise the role of stakeholder involvement throughout a NAP 
process. This requires “stakeholder mapping” exercise, establishing a multi-stake-
holder advisory or working group and steps to secure participation of marginalised or 
13 For example, Kenya and Honduras.
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at-risk groups (DIHR/ICAR Toolkit 2017, p.20–23). In addition, it entails a need for 
transparency: information about “key milestones in the NAP process and participation 
opportunities such as dialogues, workshops, consultation events, and comment peri-
ods” should be readily available (see also UNWG, 2014, p. 14).
Likewise, concerning the scope, content and priorities of a NAP, both documents 
highlight the need for alignment to the UNGPs. To this end, they share the view that 
a baseline assessment should be undertaken “to inform the formulation and prioriti-
sation of actions in a NAP” (DIHR/ICAR, 2017 p.25; cf ENNHRI) and as a datum 
to inform stakeholders in the context of consultations. A baseline assessment should 
also promote a NAP’s context-specificity, a key criterion for the UNWG.
Turning to implementation, monitoring, and review, the DIHR/ICAR Toolkit 
(2017, p.36) asserts that:
“Publishing a NAP is not the end of the process, but rather the beginning 
of the implementation phase. Incorporating an implementation plan, mon-
itoring and review mechanisms, and reporting mechanisms into a NAP 
Table 1  States with published business and human rights NAPs
Country Year published Period covered by NAP
Belgium 2017 Open ended
Chile 2017 August 2017–2019
Colombia 2015 Dec 2015–Dec 2018
Czechia 2017 Oct 2017–2022
Denmark 2014 Open ended
Finland 2014 Open ended
France 2017 Open ended
Georgia* 2018 March 2018–2020
Germany 2016 December 2016–2020
Ireland 2017 November 2017–2020
Italy 2016; updated 2018 December 2016–2021
Japan 2020 October 2020–2025
Lithuania 2015 Open ended
Luxembourg 2018; updated 2020 June 2020–2022
Netherlands 2013 Open ended
Norway 2015 Open ended
Poland 2017 May 2017–2020
Slovenia 2018 Open ended
South Korea* 2019 Open ended
Spain 2017 July 2017–July 2020
Sweden 2015 Open ended
Switzerland 2016; updated 2020 2020–2023
Thailand 2019 2019–2022
United Kingdom 2013; updated 2016 Open ended
United States of America 2016 Open ended
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increases the likelihood that the commitments made in the NAP will be 
implemented in practice” (p.36).
Implementation and effective monitoring are thus regarded as closely linked. They 
are also said to require that a NAP’s objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, 
relevant and time-specific (SMART) and, besides government-led progress reviews, 
the undertaking of independent and peer-reviews, and monitoring at national, regional 
and international levels. Stakeholder monitoring arrangements should include “state 
institutions, business, and civil society” (DIHR/ICAR (2017 p.37).
Finally, both guidances urge NAPs’ periodic revision and renewal. The UNWG 
includes review, monitoring and regular updating as one of its five essential NAP 
criteria (UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 2014, 2015, UN 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights 2016). According to the Toolkit,
“Incorporating a commitment to update a NAP allows the lessons learnt 
during creation, implementation, and review to be put into practice and 
demonstrates a commitment to progressively realise the “protect, respect, 
remedy” framework of the UNGPs” (DIHR/ICAR 2017, p.47).
Table  3 maps the elements of NAPs guidance as mentioned against de Búrca 
et  al.’s (2013, 2014) features of experimentalist governance, namely openness to 
participation of ‘stakeholders’ in a non-hierarchical process (EG1); articulation of a 
broadly agreed common problem (EG2); implementation by lower-level actors with 
Table 2  States currently developing business and human rights NAPs
Country Date commitment/process announced
Argentina December 2017 (commitment in NAP on Human Rights)
Ecuador October  15th, 2020 (government announcement)
Honduras November, 2018 (government announcement)
India November, 2018 (government announcement)
Indonesia June  19th, 2015 (NHRI announced process of drafting NAP)
Kenya February  9th, 2016 (process launched by Attorney General)
Liberia July, 2018 (government commitment)
Malaysia March  24th, 2015 (government commitment)
Mexico December, 2015 (launched during the UN Annual Forum on Business 
and Human Rights)
Mongolia April, 2019 (government appointed working group)
Morocco Not clear*
Pakistan October  17th, 2019 (Ministry of Human Rights initiated process)
Peru September  27th, 2018 (commitment in NAP on Human Rights)
Portugal No information in English
Scotland December  10th, 2013 (commitment in NAP on Human Rights)
Uganda 2016 (Accepted UPR recommendation)
Ukraine January, 2019 (Ministry of Justice announced commencement of process)
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local knowledge and contextualisation (EG3); continuous feedback, reporting, and 
monitoring (EG4); and revision and re-evaluation involving peer review (EG5).
This shows how the attributes of experimentalist governance, on one hand, 
and the recommendations advanced by the NAP guidance documents consid-
ered above, on the other, overlap. Given this, if actual NAPs processes under-
taken by states and stakeholders align with NAPs guidance, they too may have 
attributes that are characteristic of, or which could contribute to, experimentalist 
governance.
Vice versa, if NAPs practice across states does not follow NAPs guidance, this 
is also potentially informative. If divergences between NAPs guidance and actual 
NAPs processes are observed uniformly across all states this might be because, for 
instance, experimentalist governance is essentially less likely in the area of busi-
ness and human rights than in other policy domains or areas of human rights (de 
Búrca 2017; Armeni 2015; Kenner and Peake 2017; Goldstein and Ansell 2018), 
for instance, due to greater and universal power differentials between key players 
(Birchall 2021). Or, if traits of experimentalist governance are observed in some, 
but not other states’ business and human rights NAPs, this might trigger a search for 
contingent, rather than structural, factors to explain this.
Fig. 1  Diagram extracted from the Toolkit (DIHR/ICAR 2017) constituting the “essential” phases 
flagged by the UNWG NAPs guidance
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Preliminary Analysis of NAPs Against Experimentalist Governance 
Criteria
Twenty-five states have concluded business and human rights NAPs processes. The 
www. globa lnaps. org (2020) website presents, for each published NAP, a breakdown 
of its content into different topics and themes, for example, children’s rights, corrup-
tion, forced labour and modern slavery. In addition, www. globa lnaps. org presents for 
each NAP various materials describing or relating to its production, such as reports 
from stakeholder meetings, baseline assessments, inputs and commentaries from 
NGOs, business associations and other actors. For this article, we reviewed the www. 
globa lnaps. org data on the twenty-five published NAPs; the texts of those NAPs; and 
Fig. 2  Stakeholder participation in NAPs
Fig. 3  Ministries or bodies organising NAP processes
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other external sources and commentaries. Next, we present our initial qualitative anal-
ysis of these materials according to the following categories, derived from Table 3: (i) 
stakeholder participation; (ii) agreement on common problem; (iii) implementation, 
monitoring and reporting, and; (iv) revision and re-evaluation involving peer review.
Stakeholder Participation in NAP Processes
Stakeholders participated in the production of NAPs in all of the twenty-five states 
that published a NAP (Fig. 2).
As these data show, the extent and modalities of stakeholder engagement var-
ied widely across states, however. Mechanisms to facilitate stakeholder involve-
ment included national multi-stakeholder conferences on business and human rights 
(for example, Chile and Colombia); stakeholder dialogues for specific sub-national 
regions (for example, Colombia, Italy, Sweden); separate workshops for business and 
civil society (for example, Chile, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, and the UK); questionnaires or interviews 
(for example, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland; public consultations or written 
submissions (for example, Belgium, Chile, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia; 
Switzerland, Thailand, the UK); and establishment of a multi-stakeholder  steering 
group (for example, Colombia, Czechia, Germany and Switzerland).
In Colombia, Czechia, Germany and Switzerland, a multi-stakeholder steering group 
was given the actual task of developing the NAP. Germany’s NAP Steering Committee, for 
instance, comprised representatives of six government ministries (Fig. 3), trade associations, 
Germany’s national human rights institution, a trade union representative and one civil soci-
ety representative.14 Besides, in Germany, over 100 stakeholders attended an opening con-
ference at which they provided inputs from which ten priorities to be addressed by the NAP 
were extracted. In addition, a sequence of expert hearings were organised jointly,
“by organizations from different stakeholder groups (government, trade 
unions, business, civil society). NGOs, including Amnesty International and 
Oxfam, were [also] nominated… Each stakeholder group selected 10 experts 
who represented them and their approaches during the meeting…”15
In the Netherlands, by contrast, a consultant was engaged on behalf of the govern-
ment who conducted “27 interviews with more than 50 people representing the main 
stakeholder groups (business, civil society and implementing organisations) during the 
pre-drafting phase, as well as a round of single stakeholder consultations during the 
drafting process”.16 In France, twelve stakeholder groups were consulted, while input to 
the NAP was provided by France’s national “CSR Platform”. In Belgium, stakeholders 
were invited to “submit ideas and propositions on relevant actions” in the initial stages.17
14 See: https:// globa lnaps. org/ count ry/ germa ny/
15 See: https:// globa lnaps. org/ count ry/ germa ny/
16 See: https:// globa lnaps. org/ count ry/ nethe rlands/.
17 See: https:// globa lnaps. org/ count ry/ belgi um/.
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In terms of categories of stakeholder participating in NAPs processed embraced: 
national and local government departments and agencies; national human rights insti-
tutions (NHRIs); civil society organisations (CSOs); businesses (individual businesses 
and umbrella organisations); labour and trade unions; international agencies; academics; 
and specific groups of rights-holders. All but two NAPs processes (Lithuania and South 
Korea) involved both business and civil society participants. However, only in nine states 
were steps taken to involve groups at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalisation, 
such as indigenous peoples or persons with disabilities.18 In addition, NAPs have gener-
ally not entailed or been preceded by actual stakeholder mapping exercises to identify 
relevant constituencies. Indeed, only nine NAPs processes took steps to integrate vulner-
able groups. As a result, across business and human rights NAPs processes,
“older persons, children, LGBTI, persons with disabilities, women, representa-
tives of indigenous communities, the self-employed, and small and medium-
sized businesses –[have] not been adequately included” (Ferguson et al. 2018).
Most NAPs also provide for stakeholder engagement in follow-up and review 
mechanisms, discussed further below.
Agreement on Framework Definition of a Common Problem
Business and human rights NAPs and NAPs processes appear to embody a broad 
problem definition shared across states and stakeholders. All published NAPs are 
explicitly linked to the UNGPs with the majority loosely structured according to 
the three pillars of the UN Framework (Morris et al. 2018). All NAPs also express a 
government commitment to implement the UNGPs.
Guidance suggests that NAPs should systematically reflect on each of the UNGPs 
and its relevance in the national context in question (ENNHRI 2012, p.5). Yet only 
two states’ NAPs (Italy and Spain) are structured to address each UNGP individu-
ally (see Fig. 4). A National Baseline Assessment (NBA) to audit gaps in national 
UNGPs implementation and identify “the most salient human rights issues in a 
given context” (DIHR/ICAR 2017, p.25) can be one mechanism by which such anal-
ysis can be undertaken.
To date, NBAs have been undertaken by eleven of the twenty-five states with 
NAPs. In seven of these, the NBA was completed before the NAP, while in four 
states, publication of the NBA followed the NAP.19 Of the seven NBAs completed 
beforehand, five were produced by external organisations on behalf of the state; and 
two by the state and other organisations jointly. Germany’s NBA was developed by 
the German Institute for Human Rights and involved three rounds of consultations 
with stakeholders from government, trade unions, business and civil society.20 The 
content of Germany’s NBA drew on these consultations and the NBA, officially 
18 Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand.
19 Countries that have developed NBAs: Chile, Czechia, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Norway, Thailand. Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Switzerland  (2nd draft) and the Netherlands conducted NBAs following publication of 
their initial NAPs.
20 See: https:// globa lnaps. org/ count ry/ germa ny/.
1 3
National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: an…
adopted by the NAP steering committee, was key to orienting next steps in the 
process.
In Georgia, similarly, a coordination group including representatives from the gov-
ernment’s Human Rights Secretariat, an NGO and the NHRI was established to jointly 
undertake the NBA. Here, three consultations with the civil service, business, and 
civil society organisations were held. A draft NBA was shared with these entities and 
their feedback incorporated into the final NBA. Stakeholders in Germany and Georgia 
hence appear to have participated in problem definition and the identification of policy 
responses. Yet, this does not seem true of all NBA processes. In Norway, for instance, 
an NBA was devised “through interviews with officials from various ministries and 
government institutions” while broad stakeholder involvement not realised.21
Implementation, Monitoring and Reporting
NAP guidance recommends that NAPs should contain measures to monitor and 
communicate about their implementation. A majority of published NAPs do so: 
indeed, seventeen states’ NAPs commit to producing progress reports and to estab-
lishing a committee or forum to monitor NAP implementation. Yet, as Table  4 
shows, only eight states have actually produced the promised progress reports (Bel-
gium, Chile, Columbia, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). 
Furthermore, most NAPs do not identify indicators by which progress towards 
implementation could be meaningfully measured, milestones or final deadlines for 
achievement of their stated objectives.
Fig. 4  NAP structures
21 See: https:// globa lnaps. org/ count ry/ norway/.
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A minority of NAPs do include targets and mechanisms to support monitoring. 
Germany’s NAP included an aim:
“that at least 50 % of all enterprises based in Germany with more than 500 
employees will have incorporated the elements of human rights due diligence 
described in this chapter into their corporate processes by 2020… [if] the tar-
get is thus missed, the Federal Government will consider further action, which 
may culminate in legislative measures” (German Federal Foreign Office, 2016, 
p. 10).
When it was found in 2020 that only “13 to 17 percent of the enterprises observed 
complied with the NAP requirements” (German Federal Foreign Office, 2020), a 
process was triggered that culminated in the adoption of a new national corporate 
human rights due diligence law.22 Companies covered by the law must identify 
risks of human rights violations and environmental destruction by direct suppli-
ers and, where relevant, indirect suppliers (Methven O’Brien 2021). Yet, this con-
crete approach to monitoring, particularly the threat of legislative tied to specific 
milestones, is unique. As Table 4 shows, albeit twelve NAPs assign responsibility 
for actions to named entities, six NAPs identify timelines for achieving some or all 
actions; seven NAPs rely on indicators or dates for completing actions.
In addition, as noted elsewhere, there is a noticeable a tendency for NAPs to reca-
pitulate existing measures, linking these to the UN Framework ex post facto (Augen-
stein et  al. 2018; Ferguson et  al., 2018), rather than including UNGPs-inspired 
measures ex novo.
Revision and Re‑evaluation Involving Peer Review
Both experimentalist governance theory and NAPs guidance emphasise the need for an 
ongoing cycle of policy revision. Such an approach is observable across a number of 
states in practice. As shown in Table 1, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the UK have 
published revised or updated NAPs; Poland has committed to fully revising its NAP; and 
the Netherlands seems set to release an updated NAP shortly. Spain’s NAP situates itself 
within a “continuous process”, promising an updated version after three years. Belgium’s 
NAP likewise commits to evaluation and possible revision after three years. Czechia’s 
NAP states that it is a “living document” that can be updated and Chile’s includes a 
“roadmap” specifying thirteen issues for consideration in a second version.
As regards peer review, albeit without any formal mandate, various regional and 
international organisations have convened peer learning events on NAPs in recent 
years, with wide state participation, in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas, as 
well as inter-regionally. The Council of Europe has established an online platform 
for information exchange on NAPs and a standard questionnaire for states. Together, 
these might in principle unearth information needed to facilitate peer review, yet 
22 DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, ‘Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes über 
die Unternehmerischen Sorgfaltspflichten in Lieferketten ‘, Drucksache 19/28649, 19.04.2021, available 
at https:// dserv er. bunde stag. de/ btd/ 19/ 286/ 19286 49. pdf.
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COE states have so far proved somewhat unresponsive to this initiative (Methven 
O’Brien 2021).
Experimentalist Business and Human Rights Governance: Are NAPs 
Measuring Up?
The last section summarised results of our analysis of NAPs processes in twenty-
five countries against characteristics derived from recommendations made by NAPs 
guidance and traits of experimentalist governance as proposed by scholars.23 Here, 
we explore the potential significance of the findings reported and highlight aspects 
warranting further research.
Our first observation was that stakeholder involvement is widespread across 
NAPs; generally spans stakeholder categories; and in many cases is supported 
through the establishment of institutions or structures. In itself, this appears posi-
tive and in alignment with experimentalist governance tenets. On the other hand, 
dedicated measures to give voice to rights-holders at heightened risk of business 
and human rights abuses were generally lacking. From the perspective of experi-
mentalist governance, especially in the absence of defined legal mandates or the 
involvement of elected representatives, “democratic legitimacy” depends on par-
ticipation (de Búrca et al. 2013, p. 785); more particularly, it requires “targeted 
empowerment of marginalised social groups” (MacDonald and MacDonald 2020, 
p.536). This study has not revealed whether NAPs open up business and human 
rights governance in ways that tend to mitigate existing patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion, or whether they rather reproduce, or even exacerbate, the influence of 
“self-selecting and usually already powerfully positioned participants” (de Búrca 
2010, p. 236). Given the common centring of NAPs on the UN Framework and 
UNGPs, it may also be that dissenting parties who for whatever reason do not 
accept this framework as a point of departure, or marginal actors lacking capac-
ity to engage with abstract international human rights norms, are already effec-
tively excluded. What this article has shown, then, is the urgency of investigating 
and finding ways better to qualify the character of stakeholder participation in 
NAPs, and measures to promote this, given the extensive role notionally afforded 
to stakeholder involvement in NAPs development in practice.
Second, and subject to the caveat just noted, it appears that NAPs are being 
developed on a platform of broad agreement amongst stakeholders around the def-
inition of a regulatory problem encapsulated in the UN Framework and UNGPs. 
Still, if government, business, civil society actors and others have been prepared 
23 To recap, for readers’ convenience, these we identified earlier as (i) openness to participation of 
‘stakeholders’ in a non-hierarchical process; (ii) articulation of a framework definition of a problem or 
goals which identifies open-ended objectives to be pursued; (iii) implementation by ‘lower-level’ actors 
with knowledge of local conditions and discretion to adapt framework norms to these different contexts” 
(de Búrca et al. 2014, p.478; de Búrca et al. 2013, p.739; Sabel and Simon 2011, p.55); (iv) continuous 
feedback and “mutual monitoring and peer review, serving an accountability function (de Búrca et  al. 
2013, p.742); v) periodic revision and re-evaluation of goals and practices in light of peer review and 
shared purposes” (de Búrca et al. 2014, p.478).
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prima facie to engage in discussion of the application of specific international 
human rights standards to the national setting, the depth of agreement, and its 
motivation, remain unclear. Relatedly, this study has not disclosed the extent of 
conflicts between actors in a given NAP process, or across NAPs, over interpreta-
tion of norms, the identification or selection of priorities. Deeper-reaching indi-
vidual case studies and comparative studies should be undertaken to supplement 
our findings in this regard.
At the same time, there is a relatively high degree of variation in the structure 
and approach of NAPs, with few favouring, for instance, the transparent UNGP-by-
UNGP approach advocated by guidance. Such inconsistencies are a challenge for 
certain forms of accountability: NAPs cannot be meaningfully compared, on this 
basis, by applying simple binary parameters. Yet such divergences across NAPs’ 
content, and underinclusivity, are actually expected by experimentalist govern-
ance theory, which foresees a lack of agreement between governments on precise 
approaches or solutions, value differences, and thus a persisting role for the exercise 
of regulatory discretion by local actors. This indeed forms part of the rationale for 
scrutiny via peer-review, considered further below.
Thirdly, its learning potential is a key virtue of experimentalist governance 
according to its proponents. Rather than wedding actors to one set of policies for all 
time, experimentalist governance processes should be an engine for their collabora-
tive critique, ongoing reformulation and revision. A commitment to revision reflects 
the inherent “uncertainty” of the problem to be addressed and where participants 
are conscious of the “limits on their foresight, and of the possible fallibility of ini-
tially preferred solutions” (de Búrca et al. 2014, p.479). Experimentalist governance 
regimes “must enable participants to learn continuously to redefine the problems 
they face” (de Búrca et al. 2013, p.740) as well as revising the “goals, metrics and 
procedures” that have been established initially (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, p.272).
The progressive learning dimension of revision however has obvious precondi-
tions: amongst them are reliable data on regulatory responses and outcomes, as well 
as openness of governments to update instruments. In this area, published NAPs do 
both well and poorly. NBAs, which may be viewed as a proxy for local knowledge 
on the business and human rights state of play, and a ground zero against which 
to measure progress over time, are sparse. Granular national policy commitments 
linked to numerical or even qualitative targets are few and far between. Given this, 
informed reflection on how effective specific policy approaches on business and 
human rights are will be hard. Peer review at regional or international level will have 
little to “bite” on beyond anecdotal or case reports which, while not without sig-
nificance, are an incomplete basis for evaluating policy effectiveness (Ferguson et al. 
2018, p.10). Overall, without a more extensive infrastructure of targets, benchmarks, 
indicators and reporting formats, this and their concomitant capacity to contribute to 
policy “learning” will remain weak.
This carries implications for our findings, fourthly, relating to revision of busi-
ness and human rights NAPs. To recall, a majority of NAPs commit to revision, 
while a smaller number have already been revised. On one hand, then, our data sug-
gests that states are well-inclined to revision and updating of NAPs, in accordance 
with experimentalist governance tenets. On the other hand, lacking the institutional 
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and informational apparatus needed to evaluate progress and effectiveness of busi-
ness and human rights policy measures, it is unclear how second- or subsequent 
NAPs can embody informed reflection or “policy learning”. As Ferguson et  al. 
report, though the UK produced a revised NAP following stakeholder consultation, 
“its contents simply repeated much of the original NAP” and contained “very few 
forward elements and… no objectives to monitor” (2018, p.9).
In experimentalist theory, “peer review of the diverse experience of the actors 
attempting to realise the desired outcomes” is an essential component of learn-
ing (de Búrca et  al. 2014, p.479). Uncertainties associated with a broad problem 
definition, combined with the likelihood of value conflicts within and across states, 
mean that policy choices will vary locally, and legitimately so. Discursive evalua-
tion, structured according to commonly defined parameters, will be more appropri-
ate in this setting, than imposing specific legislative forms or numerical goals and 
this is the end to which peer review should be directed. Peer dialogues around busi-
ness and human rights NAPs have been a somewhat regular occurrence over recent 
years. This is welcome. Nevertheless, peer events until now have lacked the charac-
ter of peer review, as practiced in other institutional settings, for instance the Euro-
pean Union’s Open Method of Coordination, the United Nations Universal Periodic 
Review, or in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Pres-
entations by states on their NAPs experiences cannot substitute for structured scru-
tiny by peers and stakeholders on the basis of a selection of salient parameters, as 
recently highlighted by the European Council (EC 2020).
Finally, this study permits some reflections on the value of experimentalist gov-
ernance theory and its application in the human rights domain. According to de 
Burca (2017, p.277), rather than operating as the ineffective, top-down hierarchi-
cal process characterised by its critics, human rights regimes, in reality, operate in 
a more interactive manner that resembles the core architecture of experimentalist 
governance. Moreover, she maintains that “human rights regimes… function at their 
best as dynamic, participatory, and iterative systems”. Our study lends support to 
de Burca’s (2017) observation, by highlighting the iterative and participatory pro-
cesses that generally underpin NAP processes. Nevertheless, our study also high-
lights some of the limitations of operationalising experimentalist governance in an 
empirical setting; in particular, if one wants to assess the effectiveness of human 
rights experimentalist governance — this would require in-depth, longitudinal case 
study analysis that would ideally incorporate an element of qualitative enquiry with 
stakeholders that have engaged in participatory NAP processes.
Conclusion
In tandem with their broadening uptake by states, NAPs have attracted growing 
interest from business and human rights scholars. On one side, concerns have been 
raised that NAPs are used by governments as a pretext for avoiding ‘hard’ regu-
lation (Cantu Rivera 2019) or substantive standards (Jensen, Lagoutte and Lorion 
2019), or even that they embody a tendency towards “neoliberal bureaucratisation” 
of human rights (Hibou 2015, cited by Lorion 2019, p.241). On the other side, it 
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has been suggested, NAPs might “trigger government commitments to implement 
business and human rights standards, so delivering better ‘vertical’ alignment of 
national laws, policies, and institutional practices with international commitments” 
(Methven O’Brien et  al. 2016). In addition, they might encourage the “cross-gov-
ernment participation needed to secure ‘horizontal’ policy coherence” and, if they 
promote “transparency, inclusion, participation, and non-discrimination… [also] 
empower rights-holders and generate space for dialogue and greater mutual under-
standing between stakeholders” (ibid, p.121). If, moreover, NAPs “include clear and 
evidence-based targets, milestones, and indicators, they ought additionally to pro-
vide a basis for holding governments to account and over time doing so on a com-
parative basis with other countries” (ibid., p.121).
NAPs and NAPs processes may be regulatory in themselves, exerting effects on a 
range of actors. However, they are also potentially pre-regulatory, inasmuch as they 
may lead to or create conditions encouraging the adoption of substantive policies, 
legislation or other measures, or indeed of other pre-regulatory networks or dialogue 
mechanisms. Given this, pronouncing on the ultimate consequences of business and 
human rights NAPs for effective enjoyment of human rights seems premature (cf. 
Cantu Rivera 2019). On the other hand, the character of NAPs processes can still be 
meaningfully assessed. Accordingly, this article has sought to evaluate NAPs pro-
cesses from the standpoint of experimentalist governance theory. Our analysis has 
investigated how NAPs processes are unfolding and whether they reflect the charac-
ter and role afforded to local implementation mechanisms hypothesised by experi-
mentalist governance theory and as observed in other human rights and governance 
contexts.
This study has discerned a prima facie resemblance between NAPs and local 
implementation devices premised by the institutional architecture of experimental-
ist governance (Goldstein and Ansell 2018, p.243). Consequently, NAPs may have 
potential to provide the basis for an institutional framework to address the complex 
problems that emerge in the business and human rights context and as a basis for 
“dealing with the failure of traditional problem-solving strategies and multilevel 
cooperation in decision making” (Armeni 2015, p.884). Despite such positive fea-
tures, our analysis also however points to variations across NAPs and a number of 
general weaknesses. In particular, NAPs need to institutionalise inclusion of constit-
uencies at risk of marginalisation and discrimination; they need to rest on stronger 
data at the outset and gathered and published over time on a consistent if not univer-
sally prescribed basis, and they need to be scrutinised via stronger and more routi-
nised processes of peer review.
Nevertheless, the weaknesses of NAPs identified here do not seem fatal or 
to signify a lack of traction of international business and human rights norms, 
even those of a soft law nature. Rather, highlighting the emergence of relatively 
sophisticated governance architectures in the context of NAPs practice, along 
with the limitations and preconditions that may attach to their effectiveness, our 
analysis draws attention to the potential for further development of NAPs pro-
cesses in the future, which should be informed by further research in the areas 
we have indicated above.
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